T he question of whether and when to resume building nuclear power stations is fundamental to the UK's energy strategy. Government now approves in principle of new nuclear build, but wants any new nuclear-power programme to be managed and financed wholly by the private sector, meaning that the decision on whether to proceed or not needs to be based primarily on economics. This paper analyses the case using a risk-based, realoptions approach. It is shown that it is economically advisable to invest in new nuclear power generation either now or in the very near future.
T he question of whether and when to resume building nuclear power stations is fundamental to the UK's energy strategy. Government now approves in principle of new nuclear build, but wants any new nuclear-power programme to be managed and financed wholly by the private sector, meaning that the decision on whether to proceed or not needs to be based primarily on economics. This paper analyses the case using a risk-based, realoptions approach. It is shown that it is economically advisable to invest in new nuclear power generation either now or in the very near future.
One of the biggest technological decisions facing the UK at the present time is whether and when it should build new nuclear power stations. While the 2003 Energy White Paper 1 recommended only that the nuclear option should be kept open, by this year Government 2 was stating its belief that "nuclear has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside other low carbon generation options". The background to this strengthening of the Government's position is the need to install replacement generation capacity at a time when the world's energy supply has been tightening and prices have been rising dramatically.
During the last decade of the 20th century the UK enjoyed a stable and well-balanced source-mix for power generation, and this situation continued into the first few years of the new millennium, so that in 2002 the percentage of electricity from gas-fired generation amounted to 34%, with 32% from coal, 23% from nuclear, 3% from renewables and 4% from oil and other sources 3 . But this benign situation is unlikely to continue. DTI projections for 2020 are 60% from gas, 15% from coal, 7% from nuclear, 14% from renewables, and 4% from other 4 . Gas will be the predominant fuel, and Laughton 5 suggests it is set to assume even greater dominance, accounting for 70% of all electrical power generated by then.
By 2020 rising electricity demand will have combined with the retirement and closure of aging and inefficient power stations to give rise to a need for 50 GW of new and replacement power generation, equivalent to 50 major power stations. The UK's indigenous gas supply is diminishing with the UK now a net importer. Furthermore 80% of gas used in the UK is expected to be imported by 2020 6 . Of this, the Minister of State for Energy identified that 27% could come from various world-wide suppliers of liquid natural gas, 22% from Norway, and 51% through pipelines from Russia, North Africa and Central Asia 7 . With 80% of gas being imported and with up to 70% of power generation relying on gas, the UK economy will face uncertain availability of electricity as a result of potential, political instability in some gas supplying countries 8 . At the same time there will be a rising demand for gas worldwide as emerging economies power their growth, and the two factors will work together to increase the UK's vulnerabitity to gas-price volatility. Establishing a degree of independence from world-wide economic and political events will become an important policy objective, and this implies a need for diversification of sources and fuels for electricity production.
Government intends streamlining both the safety authorisations and the planning procedures for new nuclear power stations but it has emphasised that such stations should be financed privately for the whole of their lifecycle, including decommissioning and long-term waste management 2 . This puts the economic case for new nuclear construction at the heart of the decision of whether and when to build. Traditional investment appraisal methods such as net present value fail to acknowledge the degree of uncertainty surrounding the investment, the volatility of the future value of an asset, and the length of time before an investment decision needs to be made. Real-options modelling extends the risk-based, probabilistic methods used to value stock-market options to cover tangible assets such as engineering plant that are subject to similar investment uncertainty.
Nuclear-generated electricity has the environmental advantage of zero operational carbon emissions and carbontrading regulations would increase the attractiveness of nuclear energy. However, this paper ignores the potential benefits to the nuclear case of such regulatory mechanisms.
The model for the cost of gas-generated electricity
Given the expected dominance of gas as a power-station fuel, the price of UK electricity will continue to be set by gas-generated electricity for small changes to the current mix of generation capacity such as adding a new nuclear plant or replacing several aging nuclear stations by new. In the medium term the price will be the cost of gas-generated electricity plus a mark-up.
The cost of the fuel represents about 75% of the cost of electricity generated from natural gas, so that the fluctuations in the world-market price of gas will be reflected to a great extent in the cost of gas-generated electricity. The behaviour of gas prices may be represented by geometric Brownian motion, and this will feed through to the dynamic behaviour of the cost of gas-generated electricity. In such a Brownian process, the logarithm of the ratio of the cost, G(t), of one MWh of gas-generated electricity at time, t, in the future to that at the present time, t 0 , will follow a normal distribution with mean and variance that both increase with time: µ(t -t 0 ) and σ 2 (t -t 0 ), where σ is the volatility, a key parameter: (1) This model implies that the cost of gas-generated electricity will, on average, rise over time, and that the size of the fluctuations will also increase with time. We can expect this to be a reasonable representation, given that world production of oil and gas supplies is expected to peak in the next 10 to 20 years 9 .
The nuclear electricity option
While, as noted above, the volatility of the world-market price for natural gas has a very large impact on the volatility of gas-generated electricity in the UK, for nuclear-generated electricity it is capital cost that dominates, followed by operating cost, with fuel cost (uranium) contributing only a very small fraction (of the order of 5%) to the final cost. Its near independence of variations in the price of enriched uranium means that the full cost of nuclear electricity, which we will call U (£/MWh) to denote its generation from uranium, will be approximately constant in real terms once the nuclear station has been built and commissioned 10 . An important corollary is that we may regard the cost of nuclear-generated electricity as having approximately zero volatility, certainly only a very small volatility compared with gas-generated electricity. These factors make the application of real-options methods particularly convenient to apply.
The question to be answered is "at what date may it become profitable to produce some nuclear-generated electricity in preference to gas-generated electricity?". This question may be transposed into the problem of determining the value of the ability (but not the obligation) to produce a unit of nuclear-generated electricity at a strike cost, U, at a particular exercise date, t. There will be no advantage if the prevailing cost of gas-generated electricity, G(t), is less than the strike cost, U, at this time, in which case no nuclear electricity need be produced.
If, on the other hand, the cost of gas-generated electricity is greater than the strike cost, the benefit will be the difference G(t) -U . Hence the payoff for this option will be:
(In reality, it is likely that nuclear electricity would still be produced and sold even when G(t) < U, since the marginal cost of nuclear electricity would almost certainly still be lower than the cost of gas-generated electricity. While such a strategy would be sensible once the capital cost had been sunk, and would favour an earlier nuclear investment, no benefit has been taken from it in formulating the problem of whether or not to proceed with a nuclear investment. )
It has been noted already that U is essentially independent of time in real terms, and thus the problem is exactly analogous to valuing a European call option, for which a solution was found by Black and Scholes in 1973 11 , which would later win them the Nobel Prize for Economics. Based on the avoidance of arbitrage (the generation of guaranteed profits for no initial investment), the Black-Scholes option-pricing formula gives the amount, C(t), that should be paid now for such a call option, exercisable t years from now, as:
( 3) where (4) Here r is the low-risk, discount rate (equivalent in to the risk-free rate in financial options) and Φ(x) is the standard normal distribution function.
Application
Research carried out at City University 12 suggests that the current price of gas-generated electricity is G(t 0 )=22.92 £/MWh, where t 0 = 2006. The volatility of gas-generated electricity, σ, will be dominated by variations in the price of natural gas, although precautions need to be taken to filter out the gross fluctuations of the spot market, since this does not reflect the buying activity of large industrial users. Taking this buying behaviour into account yields a value of σ≈ 0.1 .
Assuming that the nuclear station under consideration is a modern pressurised-water reactor (PWR) with 1150 MWe sent out, the overnight construction cost (the build cost referred to the start-up date), B, is conservatively estimated as B = 1,800 (£M), the annual cost of operations, maintenance and fuel procurement and management as A = 152.4 (£M) and the economic life as n = 50 years. The value of n is conservative in view of the 60-year design life of the new generation of reactors such as the EPR, and the life extensions to 60 years that have been approved for a number of PWR's in the USA. The overall unit cost of electricity production is calculated as U = 42.21 £/MWh. This figure makes allowance not only for the annual costs included within A but also for interest on debt, dividends on the equity finance and a conservative allowance for decommissioning, assumed to occur immediately after final shutdown. It may be compared with the DTI's range 2 of overall costs: 30 £/MWh ("low"), 38 £/MWh ("central") and 44 £/MWh ("high").
The low-risk discount rate, r, is a real rate appropriate for discounting over very long periods of time. For example, 2.5% is used by BNFL in evaluating its long-term decommissioning liabilities, while British Energy uses 3.0% for a similar purpose. Using a low discount rate is conservative, in that the option is given a lower value. We shall present results for the range 0.025 ≤ r ≤ 0.45 .
We may use the figures above to work out the value of the option to produce and sell a MWh of nuclear power in each year in the future using the results from Black and Scholes. The way to secure the option to supply nucleargenerated electricity over an n-year period is to build and operate a nuclear power station, for which a cost may also be estimated.
Considering a new nuclear power station, we need to year may then be multiplied by this figure to give the station's total option value for that year. Hence the total value today, V t0 (t s ), of the option (but not compulsion) to produce the electricity from this station in all its operating years from the start-up date, t s , is:
Meanwhile the cost of the option to produce nuclear electricity for 50 years from a given date consists of the capital cost of the nuclear power station plus the operating and maintenance charges, which to a first approximation will be independent of the amount of electrical power generated in the year. Let the cost referred to the start-up date, t s , be denoted K ts (t s ) . This is found by adding to the overnight construction cost, B, the annual costs, A, discounted using the low-risk discount rate, r, introduced previously: (6) We may refer this future cost back to the current date, t 0 , using the low-risk discount rate once again to find K t0 (t s ):
where K t0 (t s ) is the amount that must be invested at time, t 0 , at the low-risk rate, r, so that the required sum, K ts (t s ), becomes available at time, t s . K t0 (t s ) is thus the total amount of money needed at the present time, t 0 , to guarantee that the 1.15 GWe nuclear power station can produce electrical power from its start-up date, t s , right through its n-year operating lifetime.
There will be a clear signal to start up a nuclear power station at time, t s , when the value of the option to produce from that time onwards exceeds the cost of ensuring nuclear power production, i.e. when: (8) The plant will take about five years to build and it is likely to take at least three years to get through the political process and then a planning inquiry. Hence the decision to build will need to be taken by the commissioning utility at least 8 years before the time, t s , evaluated above.
Results

Base case: low-risk discount rate = 3.5% pa
The value in 2006 of the ability to produce the lifetime's output of a 1.15 GWe nuclear power station starting at various dates in the future is shown in Figure 1 . Also shown is the amount that needs to be invested at low risk in 2006 in order to be able to build and commission the nuclear plant by the specified start-up date. The cross-over occurs in 2014, implying that a decision to go ahead ought to be made this year, in 2006.
Sensitivity to low-risk discount rate and price volatility of gas-generated electricity
The calculation has been repeated with the discount rate in the range,0.025≤r0.045, and with the price volatility of gas-generated electricity in the range, 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 0.15 . Table 1 presents the date when the commissioning utility should take the decision to build, 8 years before the electricity should be generated. A positive decision to build new nuclear plant is indicated for all assumptions on r and σ, with the central values suggesting that the decision should be taken now or in the next few years.
Sensitivity to low-risk discount rate and overall cost of nuclear-generated electricity
The calculation has been repeated with the discount rate in the range, 0.025 ≤ r ≤ 0.045, and with the overall cost of nuclear-generated electricity in the range, 30 ≤ U ≤ 44 £/MWh, as suggested in the Energy Review 2 . The date when the commissioning utility should take the decision to build is given in Table 2 . Comparing the Government nuclear-generation costs with the figure of U = 42.21 £/MWh presented in this article, it is clear that the effect of the variation in U is merely one of timing: the higher cost pushes the decision back a year or so, while the lower costs advance the advisability of a positive decision by a few years. In some scenarios the decision to build may be delayed a decade from now, but in others the decision should have been made in favour of new nuclear build several years ago, at the end of the last century. A positive decision to build new nuclear plant is indicated at some stage for all assumptions.
Conclusions
The value of the ability to generate nuclear electricity from a given date has been calculated by analogy with valuing the European call option of the financial world, where the Black-Scholes formula ensures a fair price by avoiding the possibility of either the buyer or the seller making a riskfree profit from no initial investment. The cost of producing nuclear electricity takes the place of the strike price of the European call option, which does not vary with time; the nuclear production cost will be similarly independent of time because the price of the uranium commodity makes up such a small fraction of the total cost of nuclear generation that fluctuations in world uranium price will have essentially no effect. While the true cost of nuclear production cannot be known absolutely in advance, as would be the case with the strike price in the call option, it is possible to compensate for this by building significant conservatism into the estimate, as has been done above. A low-risk discount rate appropriate for long-term investments has been chosen to take the part of the riskfree rate specified for short periods that may be employed in the valuation of financial instruments.
The value of the ability to produce nuclear electricity at various dates in the future has been compared with the cost of ensuring that the capability exists at that time. This cost includes operating and decommissioning costs, which are all referred to the current time using the low-risk discount rate. At some point the value of the ability to produce nuclear electricity will match the cost of the capability to do so. This indicates that building a nuclear power-plant has become a low-risk investment.
The results suggest that starting construction of a new nuclear power plant in the UK within the next few years may be regarded as a low-risk, commercial investment even without the benefit of regulatory mechanisms such as emissions trading. A decision to seek the necessary con-sents prior to building the nuclear power plant is economically advisable soon, with a view to ensuring that the power station could come on stream in the next ten years or so.
It has been pointed out by Roques et al 13 that since gasgeneration acts as a price setter for electricity, utilities could continue exclusively with gas-fired power stations even in the face of strongly rising gas prices, because they could pass on their price increases with impunity directly to the consumer. The analysis presented here, however, would suggest that such a strategy would cause the profitability of the utility to fall below its potential. Thus the chance of achieving greater profits would act as an incentive for new nuclear generation to be introduced to the market. The utility would need still to weigh up the planning and regulatory risks, and test carefully the reassurances offered in these areas by Government in its Energy Review.
